pages: RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf, 24
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RecreationandParkCommission | 2017-12-14 | 24 | requirement, even when on public property. While the city may wish to foster educational opportunities, the public school system, including charter schools, is available as an alternative, as well as other religious schools that accept students of all religious faiths. Footnote No. 7 Moreover, as discussed above, courts have rejected the claim that an arm's-length lease of public property to a religious group gives the government's "imprimatur of approval" and "endorsement" to the religious beliefs of the group. (See Hawley v. City of Cleveland, supra. 24 F.3d at 822; Christian Science v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 784 F.2d at 1014- 1017; Brashich v. Port Auth. of New York, supra, 484 F.Supp. at 703; Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at 94-95.) While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that a court would side with the private religious school officials' free exercise of religion, speech, and association constitutional rights, regardless of which balancing test (the compelling state interest test or rational basis test) is used. (See Christian Science v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 784 F.2d at 1012-1013.) In answer to the third question, therefore, we conclude that a city may not refuse to lease a public building to a private nonprofit religious school solely on the basis that the school is not open to all religious beliefs of prospective students. ***** Footnote No. 1 "No state shall make or enforce any laws which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Footnote No. 2 California courts have interpreted these provisions in the same manner as federal courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirshner (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586, 588; In re Evans (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1270; Reece v. Alcoholic Bev. Etc. Appeals Bd. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 675,679.) Footnote No. 3 These federal constitutional protections are enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 330 U.S. 1, 8; Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303-304.) Footnote No. 4 "[A] neural law of general application need not be supported by a compelling state interest 11 (People v. Peck (1996) 52 Cal.App.4t 351, 358.) However, if the government burden is upon not only an individual's free exercise of religion right but also upon some other constitutional right such as freedom of speech or freedom of association (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.), a compelling state interest might be required for imposition of the state burden (see Employment Div., Ore. Dept. Of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 881; Widmar v. Vincent (1981) 454 U.S. 263, 269-270; Christian Science v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1986) 784 F.2d 1010, 1012-1013; Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Som. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1164-1165). Footnote No. 5 All references hereafter to the Civil Code are by section number only. Footnote No. 6 The legislative history of the Act fully supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude religious schools from the purview of the Act. (See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 709-715 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Footnote No. 7 Indeed, we have not been apprised that a Catholic school would deny admission to a Jewish child or a Muslim school would deny admission to a Buddhist child. We assume that the question presented has a factual basis. | RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf |