pages: RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf, 23
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RecreationandParkCommission | 2017-12-14 | 23 | Here, we believe that a lease of a public building to a private nonprofit religious school in an arms-length transaction without preference being given to religion per se would not constitute a violation of either the federal or state Constitutions. (See 45 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 89 (1965); 43 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 62 (1964); 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 309, supra.) As reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos (1987) 483 U.S. 327, 334: "'This court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.' There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interferences. " We conclude that a city may lease a public building to a private nonprofit religious school without requiring that the school be open to all religious beliefs of prospective students. 3. Refusing to Lease City Property The final question presented is whether a city may refuse to lease a public building to a private nonprofit religious school solely on the basis that the school is not open to all religious beliefs of prospective students. We conclude that the city may not so refuse. With respect to the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution, it is evident that the city's leasing policy would divide potential private religious school lessees into two groups: those who would not allow admission to students of all religious beliefs, and those who would. Whether a city may make such a division is not easily resolved. In what the United States Supreme Court has characterized as an "extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law," "we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation" between permissible and impermissible government action involving religious institutions. (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612.) On the one hand, the city's interests would include preventing religious discrimination on public property, fostering educational opportunities for all students, and avoiding giving the city's "imprimatur of approval" to the school's religious creed, whatever it might be. The establishment clause "prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief " (Id., at pp. 593-594; see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 532-533; Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU (1989) 492 U.S. 573, 605; Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at 335; Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization V. Los Angeles Community College Dist., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at 92-93.) On the other hand, the interests of the school officials include, as discussed in answer to the first question, the free exercise of religion clause, the freedom of speech clause, and the freedom of association clause of the state and federal Constitutions. (See Widmar v. Vincent, supra, 454 U.S. at 269-270.) Weighing these competing interests, we find that although a state or local government may not discriminate against religious groups, a religious group is not subject to the same | RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf |