pages: RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf, 22
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RecreationandParkCommission | 2017-12-14 | 22 | space at the San Francisco Airport for a Christian Science Reading Room. The court found that the commission's prior policy of allowing the religious group to rent space at the airport was purely secular, to obtain revenue, since (1) a standard lease was used that applied to all tenants, (2) the rent schedule was one that applied to all tenants, (3) the transaction was an arms-length real estate transaction without additional motivation, and (4) there was no purpose to advance religion. (Id., at p. 1014.) The religious benefit received by the group in operating the reading room was determined by the court to be only "incidental" and thus permissible under Widmar v. Vincent, supra, 454 U.S. at 273-274. (Ibid.) Finally, the court pointed out that there were no "entanglements" with religion since the commission did not tell the religious group how to run its reading room, and the religious group did not tell the commission how to run the airport. (Id., at p. 1015; see also generally, Walz V. Tax Commission (1970) 397 U.S. 664, 695.) The court upheld the lease under both federal and state Constitutions on the basis that the commission's prior policy did not favor or prefer any religion or religion as a whole and did not have the direct, immediate, or substantial effect of promoting religious purposes. (Id., at pp. 1014-1015; see also California Teacher's Association v. Riles (1981) 29 Cal.3d 794, 806; 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 309 (1953).) Likewise, in Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization v. Los Angeles Community College District (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 79, the court concluded that a lease of surplus property by a school district to a religious group did not violate either the federal or state Constitutions. The surplus property was offered by competitive bid for general uses, including "institutional, community or residential purposes," and the religious group was the sole bidder. The court found that (1) the purpose of the lease was to generate revenue for the school district. (2) there was no governmental sponsorship or promotion of religious objectives by virtue of the lease since all religious and secular groups had an equal opportunity to lease the property. and (3) any "entanglements" were merely those which usually occur between a landlord and tenant. (Id., at pp. 94-95.) The court noted that the California Constitution "has never been interpreted to require governmental hostility to religion, nor to prohibit a religious institution from receiving an incidental benefit from a statute which has a secular primary purpose." (Id., at p. 93.) These California cases are supported by cases in other jurisdictions. In Brashich v. Port Auth. of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 484 F.Supp. 697, affirmed (2d Cir. 1980) 628 F.2d 1344, 791 F.2d 1224, the court approved the placing of three religious chapels at John F. Kennedy Airport. The court concluded that although "the Port Authority has made accommodations for religion, it has not established religion." (Id., at p. 704.) The same conclusion was reached by the court in Hawley v. City of Cleveland, supra, 24 F.3d 814, where the city leased space for a Catholic chapel at the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. The court concluded: [T]he chapel serves the secular purpose of accommodating the religious needs of travellers and providing them with a place for rest and comfort. Moreover, because a reasonable observer would not conclude that the city endorses religion by allowing the diocese to maintain the chapel, the chapel's lease and its authorizing ordinance do not constitute an endorsement of religion, and thus their primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. We find, finally, that the chapel's lease and its authorizing ordinance also do not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, the lease and the ordinance do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. (Id., at p. 822. fn. omitted.) | RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf |