pages: RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf, 21
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RecreationandParkCommission | 2017-12-14 | 21 | The court described the Boy Scouts' educational function as particularly significant in finding that the organization was not a "business establishment" for purposes of the Act: The record establishes that the Boy Scouts is an organization whose primary function is the inculcation of a specific set of values in its youth members, and whose recreational facilities and activities are complementary to the organization's primary purpose Scouts meet regularly in small groups (often in private homes) that are intended to foster close friendship, trust and loyalty, and scouts are required to participate in a variety of activities, ceremonies, and rituals that are designed to teach the moral principles to which the organization subscribes. (Id., at pp. 697-698.) Similarly, here, a private nonprofit religious school has as its "overall purpose and function" the education of children in keeping with its religious beliefs. The "inculcation of a specific set of values," with programs "designed to teach the moral principles to which the [school] subscribes," prevents such a school from being considered a "business establishment" whose student admission practices would be subject to the Act. Footnote No. 6 Such construction of the Act is consistent with the requirements of the Constitution. (See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 722-729 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) No other constitutional or statutory provision appears to be relevant to our discussion. We thus conclude that a private nonprofit religious school may deny admission to a student solely on the basis that the student's religious beliefs are inconsistent with the religious beliefs of the school. 2. Leasing City Property The second question presented is whether a city may lease a public building to a private nonprofit religious school without requiring the school to be open to all religious beliefs of prospective students. We conclude that a city may do so. For our purposes we may assume that (1) the city has made the public building available to all private organizations or persons who might wish to utilize it, (2) the city has not restricted the building's use to religious schools, and (3) the lease has been negotiated in an arms-length transaction showing no preference to the religious school and for an adequate consideration. A city may generally lease property to private individuals or organizations. (See Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 3, 5; Gov. Code, §§ 37350, 37380, 37395.) The issue to be resolved is whether the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and its California counterpart, as quoted above, require a city to lease its property for a school only upon the condition that the school be open to all religious beliefs. Under the establishment clause, recent case law has focused upon whether the alleged violation may be construed as an "endorsement" of a particular religion. (See Hawley v. City of Cleveland (6th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 814, 822.) In Christian Science v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 784 F.2d 1010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the San Francisco Airport Commission could lease | RecreationandParkCommission/2017-12-14.pdf |